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THE QUASI CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION OF
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.W E use the term, quasi contract, in deference to writers on the
science 6f jurisprudence and to many authors of works on
technical law. Personally we do not like the term at all. The
qualifying word quasi is too frequently used when one is without an
idea and wishes to say something, or has an idea but does not know
how to express it. Mr. BISHOP, in his work on Contract Law de-
clines to recognize the term and treats of the obligation intended,
uhder a chapter on contracts created by law.'
In Hartzog v. Hertzog, LAURIE, J., gives three kinds of contracts:
"i. Express contracts, where the terms of the agreement are
openly uttered and approved at the time of the making:
"2. Implied contracts, which arise from facts showing mutual
intention to contract:
"3. Constructive contracts, which are fictions of law adapted to
enforce legal duties by actions of contract, where no proper contract
exists, express or implied."
We have constructive fraud, constructive trusts, constructive
notice, and why not constructive contract, a contractual obligation
existing in contemplation of law, in the absence of any agreement
express or implied from facts? With this apology we shall use the
term quasi contract as covering an obligation created by law and en-
forceable by an action ex contractu.
We are not for the present interested in the circumstances which
maygive riseto this obligation as be txeen individuals; nor as between
an individual and a private corporation, or quasi public corporation,
so-called, as a railroad or other public utility. In these cases the doc-
trine of unjust-enrichment usually controls. Our inquiry relates to
the conditions under which an individual may recover in implied
assumpsit for money or property received from him by a7 municipal
corporation and applied to municipal purposes under an invalid ex-
press contract-invalid for want of power to make the contract, or
by reason of an irregular exercise of power. Does the fact that a
municipality has been enriched at the expense of the individual, in:
such cases, give him a remedy in quasi contract?
The cases upon this subject are truly bewildering, and we shalt
not attempt to classify or reconcile the many decisibns on the sub-
' Bishop, Contracts, Chap. VIII.
2(18S7) 2g Pa. St. 465.
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ject.3 The task is hopeless, but it may be of interest to observe the
recent tendencies of our courts in relation to the quasi contractual
obligation of municipal corporations and we may then form some
conclusions as to the law on the subject in some jurisdictions. The
courts have considerably modified their views on the question 
in-
volved, during the past thirty years, and to an extent that renders 
a
recovery in quasi contract against municipal corporations very doubt-
ful. The question generally arises in an action for money had and 
re-
ceived, or for labor and material furnished.
I. LIABILITY FOR MONEY HAD AND RECEIVED.--At first the courts
were inclined to apply the remedy in implied assumpsit as freely
against municipalities as against private corporations. In Pimental
v. City of San Francisco,
4 the city had received the plaintiff's mon-y
on a void sale of property and had appropriated the money 
to city
purposes. FIELD, C. J., in allowing recovery, said: The facts
"show an appropriation of the proceeds, and the liability of the city
arises from the use of the moneys, or her refusal' to refund them
after their receipt. The city is not exempted from the common
obligation to do justice, which binds individuals. Such obligation
rests upon all persons, whether natural or artificial. If the city
obtain the money of another by mistake, or without authority of law,
it is her duty to refund it, from this general obligation.- If 
she
obtain other property, which does not belong to her, it is her duty 
to
restore it, or if used, to render an equivalent therefor, from the like
obligation. (Argenti v. San Francisco, 16 Cal. 256, 282.) The
legal liability springs from the moral duty to make restitution. 
And
we do not appreciate the morality which denies in such cases any
rights to the individual whose money or other 
property has been
thus appropriated. -The law countenances no such wretched ethics;
its command always is to do justice."
The doctrine of this case has been frequently followed.
5
In Long v. Lemoyne BoroughG the statute required that the reso-
lution of the borough council, -authorizing the iorrowing of money
for municipal purposes and the giving a note therefor, must 
be
presented to the chief burgess for his approval and signature. Money
was borrowed of plaintiff by the council and a note given 
therefor,
but the resolution authorizing the borrowing of money 
was not
3 For an attempt to classify the cases under suggested 
principles of distinction, see
4 Col. L. Rev. 67; 17 Harv L. Rev. 343; 28 
Cyc. 667, et seq.
4 (z863) 21 Cal. 36r, quoted approvingly in Clark v. 
Salina County, 9 Neb. 5%6;
Chapman v. County of Douglas, 107 U. S. 357.
Elliott, Corporations, § 292.
C ( 1o8), 222 Pa. St. 311. -
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presented to -the chief burgess for his approval, nor did he sign the
resolution. It was held, in an action on the note given, that the
approval of the resolution by the chief burgess was a condition
precedent to the 'right to borrow money and that the note was there-
fore void; but, said the court: "While we are compelled to so hold,
the borough will gain nothing by our reversal of the court below..
Though the bank cannot recover on the judgment note given to it,
because the attempt to do so is an attempt to -enforce an express
contract which no one had been properly authorized to execute on
behalf of the borougl, there is an implied obligation resting upon the
municipality to pay back what was lent to it in good faith." T
I In Luther v. Wheeler," municipal officers, having no authority to
do so, borrowed money for the purpose of building a town hall, market
and guard house and gave the note of the town foi the mon'ey bor-
rowed. It was held that the note was void, but that the holder might
recover of the municipality, as money had and received, the amount
received and actually used for necessary municipal purposes. Mr.
.Justice WOODS based his decision on: .i. The money was expended
for a municipal purpose impliedly authorized by the charter.. 2. The
town received full benefit of the entire amount expended. 3. The
parties concerned in the transaction acted under the belief that the
loan was temporary only and that the loan would be paid from the
regular income of the town for the current fiscal year. The tact
that they were mistaken in this belief did not relieve the town of its
liability to the plaintiff.
The majority of the more recent decisions, however, incline to a
denial of -the right to recover for money had and received by the city
without a compliance with the statutory conditions of incurring
liability; the tourts holding that constitutional or statutory limita-
tions cannot be invaded through the equitable action of implied
assumpsit.'
Two typical cases may be considered. In Agawam National Bank
v. South Hadley,"0 the treasurer of the defendant town borrowed of
plaintiff bank $2ooo and applied the same in paying debts due from
the town. The statute provided that no debts should be incurred by
the town for borrowed money except on vote of two-thirds of the
electors at town meeting. It was considered that this limitation on
power was to protect the town from extravagance of its officers
I See Paul v. City of Kenosha, 22 Wis.'256.
873 S. C. 83, 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 746.
9Whiteside v. U. S., 93 U. S. 247; Geer -z. School District, rii Fed. 682; Burgin
Y. Smith (1909), 1s' N. C_ 961; Litchfield v. B3allou, 114 U. S. 19o.
ie (x889), 128 Mass. 503.
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and that the limitation should not be evaded by allowing a recovery
in implied assumpsit for money had and received.
In McCurdy v. Shiawcassee County,
11 by resolution of the Board
of Supervisors of the defendant County, the County Treasurer was
authorized to borrow for necessary expenses, the sum of $IOOOO.
The money was borrowed of the plaintiff and notes given therefor.
The giving of the notes was appr6ved by the Board and interest paid
on them from iime to time. The.money received from plaintiff was
paid into the contingent fund of the county. in an action by the
plaintiff against the county, it was held that the plaintiff could not
recover on the notes for the reason that, under the law, the county
had no power to borrow money, except on vote of the electors of the
county at an election called for that purpose. The lower court held
that the notes were void, but that the plaintiff could recover the
money loaned on a coiunt for money had and received, saying: "In
many similar cases the highest courts of the States and Natipn have
held( in effect, that the money of the individual cannot be appro-
priated to the use of municipal corporations and the true owner
thereof be without remedy merely because the original contract,
under which the money was obtained, was made without authority
of law." (Citing many cases.) "From the foregoing I reach the
conclusion that the plaintiff is entitled to recovery upon the equitable.
count for money had and received."
In the Supreme Court the judgment was reversed. The prevailing
opinion, by MCALVAY, J., is to the effect that no recovery can be had
against the county upon equitable grounds, as for money had and
received, for money borrowed by the Board of Supervisors without
authorify of law; especially in a case where it is not inade to appear
that the county has actually used the money for authorized corporate
purposes; and that fact did not appear in this case. The judgment,
on its face, seems somewhat severe; but the facts show that 
the ad-
visability of borrowing money to take up this loan had been sub-
mitted to the voters of the county two or three times and for some
reason the electors had voted against it. The key.of the decision is
found in these words of the court: "The facts in this case do not
indicate that it would be inequitablk'to deny relief." This leaves very
little law for discussion as the action for money had and received can
be supported only on equitable grounds.
In speaking of other Michigan cases on which a recovery had been
allowed against a municipality, McALv.v, J.,said: "In these cases,
except Thomas v. City of Port Huron, the thing done had been, to
" (19o8), 154 Mic1h. 5So.
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a certain extent, authorized, or something had been sold, or property
was exchanged by the municipality. In the case at bar an ordinary
loan of money was made to the county. It was without authority of
law. Of the illegality of the transaction and the disability of de-
fendant, the plaintiff is presumed t6 have had knowledge."
The opinion of OSTRANDF,R, J., concurring in the, result, goes
somewhat farther and holds that no recovery could be had in this
case in any event. He said: "And if it appeared that the money
borrowed from the plaintiff was lawfully disbursed for current ex-
penses of the county, the decision must still be against the plaintiff.
Some statements of the judges, unnecessary to the decision, aside
the decisions of this court, have, with a single exception, recognized
and enforced rules which deny,, as between the municipality and an
individual dealing with it, any remedy for municipal default in
cases where the power to deal at all is lacking, as well as in cases.
where express statutory restrictions upon the manner of dealing have
been ignored."
The case of Allen v. LaFayette,12 is frequently cited in support of
a recovery for money had and received where a municipality
has borrowed money without authority. The municipal officers of
LaFayette purchased, under acknowledged statutory authority, a
college building and grounds, axfd paid for the same with money
borrowed from a Mrs. Frederick for which they gave her city war-
rants. In a suit by the tax payers to enjoin payment of said war-
rants it was decided that the money was borrowed without authority
and that the warrants were void; but that the court would not
enjoin their payment for the reason that the city had received the
money so borrowed and had applied it to a corporate purpose, and
that Mrs. Frederick had an equitable right to a return of the money
loaned., This case is easily distinguishable from the Shiawassee
County Case, supra, in that here the money was actually applied to
a corporate purpose and Mrs. Frederick and the authorities acted in
the utmost good faith; whereas, in the Shiawassee County* case the
courtf inclines to the view that the borrowing of money from the
plaintiff was, at the beginning, part of a scheme to evade the con-
stitutional provision prohibiting the county from borrowing money
for certain purposes and above a certain amount "unless authorized
by a majority of the electors of said county voting thereon," and that
this evasion was to be accomplished through the action for money
had and received. This fact rendered the plaintiff's case hopeless
12 (1889), 89 Ala. 64r.
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and strips the judgment of some of its weight as authority in cases
where real equities exist.'
It must be.conceded, however, that the tendency of recent decisions
is to deny recovery against a municipality in implied assumpsit
for money borrowed unless authority to borrow is expressly given
or is necessarily implied, and the fact alone that the moneys borrowed
are devoted to corporate purposet will not justify a recovery. The
liability of municipalities to bona fide purchasers of municipal se-
curities, valid on their face, is not within the purview of this dis-
cussion.
II. LIABILITY rOR LABOR AND MATERIAr, FURNISHIED.-The reas-
ons for denying a recovery against a municipal corporation on an
implied assumpsit for money borrowed without authority, and the
distinction between the power to borrow money and the power to be-
come indebted, is clearly stated by SELDEN, J., in Ketchum, v. The
City of Buffalo," as follows: "If the power of the corporation to
use its credit is limited to contracting directly for the accomplish-
ment of the object authorized by law, then the avails or consideration
of the debt created cannot be diverted to any illegitimate purpose.
The contract not only creates the fund, but secures its 'ust appropria-
tion. On the contrary, if the money may be borrowed, the corpora-
tion will be liable to repay it, although not a cent may ever be
applied to the object for which it was avowedly obtained. It may be
borrowed to build a market and appropriated to build a theatre, and
yet the corporation would be responsible for the debt. ,-The lender
is in no way accountable for the use made of the money. It is plain,
therefore, that if the policy'of limiting the powers and expenditures
-of corporations to the objects contemplated by their charters is to
be carried out, their right to incur debts for those objects must be
strictly confined to contracts which tend to their direct accomplish-
ment. If they may procure the requisite funds by the indirect method
of borrowing, they may resort to any other indirect mode of obtain-
ing them, such as establishing some profitable branch of trade, en-
tering into commercial enterprises, etc., the avowed object being to
obtain the means necessary to accomplish some authorized purpose."
These reasons when given seemed reasonable, but the experience
of the past few years has satisfied many courts that favoritism and
extravagance on the part of city officials call for limiting, rather
than extending, the remedy of quantum meruit.
In Nelson v. Mayor,. plaintiff sought to reover on the quantum
"See Frankfort v. Schmid, iS5 Mich. 313.
z 14 N. Y. 356, 366.
63 N. Y. 535-
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meruit for sewer drain pipes, etc., furnished the city under a void
contract. The court followed the equitable doctrine early announced
by Chief Justice FIEaD in Argenti v. San Francisco.10 RAPALLO, J.,
said in the Nelson case: "It does not follow, however, that though
the contract be void the plaintiff would be entirely withbut remedy.
If, as alleged, the city has-obtained his property without authority,
but has used it and received the avails of it, it would seem that, in-
dependently of the express contract, an implied obligation would
arise to make compensation.- (Citing Argenti v. San Francisco ap-
provingly.) - * If the city obtain money of another by mistake
or without authority of law, it is her duty to refund it, not from any
contract entered into by her on the subject, but from the general
obligation to do justice which binds all persons, whether natural or
artificial. If the city obtain other property which does not belong
to her, it is her duty to restore it, or if used by her to render an
equivalent to the true owner."
The doctrine of this case came before the same court in the case
of McDonald v. Mayor,'7 so frequently cited approvingly that it inay
be regarded as a leading, case.- It distinguishes the case of Nelson v.
Mayor in that in the latter case the tity had not only obtained the
property of plaintiff under a void contract, but had collected the
value of it from the property owners by neans of assessments. The
general doctrine of that case is disapproved of, and the court held
that "where the municipal charter prohibits its officers from con-
tracting on its behalf for the purphase of materials, save in cases
and in a manner specified, the municipality is neither liable upon a
contract made by an official in violation of, or without a compliance
with, the requirements of the charter, nor can the value of materials
furnished under the contract be recovered upon any implied liability."
In the McDonald case plaintiff had delivered to the Superintend-
ent of Streets stone and gravel which were used in repairing the
streets of the city. The plaintiff believed that the Superintendent
had authority to contract for the same; but the necessity for the
purchase or the use of the material was not certified to by the head
of the Department of Public Works, nor was the expenditure au-
thorized by the common council, nor was a contract entered into
with the lowest bidder after publication of a notice inviting propos-
als,. as was provided by the charter, in this case. The court decided
that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover on implied assumpsit.
FOLGR, J., in delivering the opinion of the court said: "It is plain,
that if the restriction put upon municipalities by the legislature, for
16'x6 Cal. 256.
17 68 N. Y. 23.
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the purposes of reducing and limiting the incurring of debt and the
expenditure of the public money, may be removed, upon the doctrine
now contended for, there is no legislative remedy for the evils of
municipal government, which of late have excited so much attention
andpainful foreboding. Restrictions and inhibition by statute are
practically of no avail, if they can be brought to naught by the un-
authorized action of every official 'of lowest degree, acquiesced in, or
not repudiated by, his superiors. * * * Its purpose is to forbid and
prevent the making of contracts by unauthorized official agents, for
supplies for.the use bf the corporation. This opinion goes no further
than to hold, that where a person makes a contract with the city of
New York for supplies to it, without the requirements of the charter
being observed, he may not recover the value thereof upon an im-
plied liability."
It is believed that this opinion is in accord with authority at this
time, and has had salutary effect in protecting tax payers from the
extravagance of irresponsible city officials. 8
The law in Michigan on the right of an individual to recover on
the quantum meruit for benefits conferred, by way of labor and
material, upon municipalities, under i void contract, is somewhat
disturbed by the two decisions handed down in the Shiawassee
County case (supra). Previous to that case a recovery in implied.
assumpsit had been frequently allowed, although the decisions had
been. somewhat in conflict.
In Peterson v. City of Ionia,"" it was decided that "Where the com-
mon council of a city under due authority let a contract for the im-
provement of a street, and later, without observing the formalities
required by thd charter, employed the contractor to raise the grade
of the street two feet higher than his original contract provided, and
the work was performed as agreed, the city is liable for the additional
work."
The formality required by the charter in this case was that the
Superintendent of Streets should advertise for bids for making. such
improvements and the contract should be given to the lowest bid
acceptable to the council, The contract was let to plaintiff without
this formality being taken. Counsel for plaintiff, seeking to recover
on the quantum meruit, urged that as the city had taken the benefit
of the improvement, the defense of ultra vires was inequitable and
unjust and could not be successfully urged. This contention was
allowed by the court, and it was decided. that the city, having re-
"'See Appleton Water Works Co. v. Appleton (1907), 132 Wis. S7o; Highland
v. Michie (Ky.), 1o7 S. W. 216.
0 (igo8), 252 Mich. 678.
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ceived the benefit, the plaintiff should have his right to recover. In
the opinion handed down by OSTkANDER, J., in the Shiawassee case,
supra, MONTGOMERY and HooKxR, JJ., concurring it was said:
"That when a municipality is forbidden to execute public works,
except under contracts with. the lowest bidder, there can be no re-
covery, as upon an implied contract, for work done for the benefit
of the municipality. *** The decision in Peterson v. City of Ionia,
clearly lays down an opposed rule and has the effect of overruling,
without expressly so announcing, a large number of previous de-
cisions. I think ,Peterson v. City of Ionia should be now expressly
overruled."
While the majority of the court did not concur in this opinion,
nevertheless the judgment in the Shiawassee County case indicates
that liability for benefits received can not arise as against a 'munici-
pality or be enforced through an implied assumpsit unless the statu-
tory or charter provisions which may be fairly regarded as condi-
tions precedent to the incurring of such liability, have bean sub-
stantially complied with. Municipal officers have not the power to
waive compliance with the provisions and they ought not to be
evaded by allowing'a recovery in implied assumpsit.
There is, however, a recent case in Nebraska in accord with the
Peterson case. In Nebraska Bitulithic Company v. Omaha,20 the
action was on the quantum meruit for labor and material furnished
under a contract wih the city which was void because of the fail-
ure to advertise for bids as required by the charter. The c ourt
decided that the city had the power to repair its streets, and that
although the power had been irregularly exercised, the plaintiff could
recover the fair and reasonable value of the use of plaintiff's plant in
performing the work; citing many Nebraska cases.. It is nQt thought
that this decision can be in acc6rd with the more recent decisions
in similar cases.
In Bartlett v. Lowell,2' plaintiff had furnished the City of Lowell
a quantity of gravel to be used on its public streets under contract
with the Superintendent of Streets. The Superintendent had no
authority *to make the contract; the authority to purchase supplies
being given by statute to the chief 'of the department, subject to the
approval of the mayor. The gravel was placed upon the streets and
the city had the benefit. In an action to recover its value it was
decided that the plaintiff was conclusively presumed to know the
Superintendent's want of power to make the contract, and the 'court
disallowed the contention that the defendant having had the benefit of
' (19o9), 84 Neb. 375.
= (Z909), 201 Mass SZ, 155.
MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW
the plaintiff's property should pay the reasonable value thereof. The
court said: "If the court were to adopt that result it would be put-
ting the seal of the law upon a plain evasion of St. 1896, c. 415, Sec.
3; and if that be law all statutes imposing limitations upon the crea-
tion of municipal indebtedness can be evaded by a person, who is
not a contractor, delivering personal property, and after that prop-
erty has been used so that it cannot be restored, claiming to be paid
the reasonable value of it."
III. LEGisLATivE PROHIBITION Or THE QUASI CONTRACTUAL
OBLIGATION.-Most states regulate the making of municipal con-,
tracts by prescribing the manner and form, thus leaving, open the
question of liability on implied assumpsit. A' few states, however,
have gone further. The most striking example is found in the law
of the State of Ohio. In 1876 the Legislature of Ohio enacted a
statute providing how and" by whom municipal contracts should be
made, and providing further "the power or authority to make a
contract, agreement or obligation to bind the corporation, or to make
an appropriation, shall not be delegated; and every contract, agree-
ment, or obligation, and every appropriation 'of moneys made con-
trary to the provisions of'this section shall be void as against the
corporation, but biniling on the person or persons making it."
For several years after the enactment of this statute the Supreme
Co.urt of the state had allowed the recovery against municipalities
upon implied assumpsit. In City of Wellston. v. Morgan,
2 2 the
entire subject of implied liability of municipal corporations under this
statute came before the court. Plaintiff's assignor had furnished
gas for lighting streets, etc., to the defendant municipality under a
void contract. A recovery was sought on the quantum meruit for
the gas used by the city. The statute above referred to was relied
upon as a defence to the action. The court held that under this
statute no recovery whatever could be had against a municipality in
Ohio upon an" implied assumpsit, in cases where the statute applied'.
The court said: "There can, therefore, be no implied contract,
agreement or obligation, against a' municipality, and no implied
Nability, but all liability, ex contractu, iust be express, and be en-
tered into by ordinance or resolution of the council. * * * A strict
adherence to the provisions of the restrictive statutes of the state will
be for the general good; and it devolves upon those who deal with
public officers, to see for themselves that the statutes have been
complied with. * * There being no implied municipal liability in
cases ex contractu, under our restrictive statutes, it follows that to
(i9o), 65 Oh. St. 2i9.
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state a good cause of action against a municipality in such cases, the
petition must declare upon a contract, agreement, obligation, or ap-
propriation made and entered into according to statute. A petition
on an account merely, or quantum meruit, in such cases, is not
sufficient."
The statutes of some states require contracts with municipalities
for public works to be reduced to writing, the 6nsideration to be
expressed therein, and the writing to be signed by the parties before
the work is undertaken. Such is the statute of the State of Mis-
souri. This statute came before the court for construction in Cook
& Son v. City of Cameron.23 Plaintiff had entered into a written
contract, complete in every detail, with the defendant, to construct a
municipal' water works system for the city. During the progress
of the work it became necessary to change the route of the system
at an extra cost of about $I,ooo. This change was approved by the
city engineer with power to do so. His action was approved by the
city council by resolution. After the work had been completed the
city council accepted it by ordinance and acknovledged plaintiff's
claim for extra compensation. In a suit to recover this extra com-
pensation the court held that this contract for extra compensation
was void by the express terms of the statute because it was not re-
duced to writing, and signed by the parties, and that there could be
no recovery ?n an implied assumpsit based on benefits received. It
was conceded that there was an inherent power in the corporation to
make the contract, but the statute had provided that the power could
be exercised only through a written contract, and that it could not be
exercised otherwise. The court said: "It is, however, clear that,
if the statute forbidding public bodies from entering into contracts,
except in writing, is to have any effective enforcement, it will be
necessary to deny the right of Yecovery for the value of services
rendered on the ground of any implied undertaking." Plaintiff was
not allowed to recover.
Of these last two cases we are inclined to say that it may be true
that the legislature has the vower to abolish all remedy upon implied
assumpsit'as against a municipality, but the wisdom and justice of
doing so present quite a different question. It is said that the
people must be protected against the extravagance and corruption of
the officers they have elected to represetnt them; that the people
must not be burdened with taxes imposed through the conduct of
unw6rthy officials. The people selected them. and why should not the
people bear some portion of responsibility for their misconduct?
3(191o), 128 S. W. 269.
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Why should the entire burden be cast upon the individu'al dealing in
good faith with the corporation through its accredited agents?.
Would it not be well that the electors and tax payers feel that
through the power of taxation they might be held responsible in some
way at -least for the misconduct of their agents, agents of their own
selection? Perhaps this sense of resporisibility in the electdrs might
improve our municipal government. Courts ought not to be ex-
pected to right the evils in municipal government, by rendering un-
righteous judgments. The remedy is with the people. They should
elect better servants.
That the breach of an express contract, invalid for want of form
or substance, cannot give. a right of abtion on: the contract may be
conceded; but in the cases last above referred to it is held in sub-
stance and effect that even where the municipality hs the power to
make the contract in question-in fact not only ha -the power but is
burdened with the duty to do so-and the contract i ' made by and with
the sanction of the officers and boards having full authority in the
matter, and the contract is carried out in good faith by both parties
except as to payment by the municipality for the benefits received,
there can be no recovery in implied assumpsit because the contract
was not reduced to writing and signed by the parties as required by
statute. This is making the evidence of a thing of more importance
than..the thing itself. Under the Statute of Frauds the writing re-
quired is not the contract, but only the evidence of it. A breach of
an oral contract coming under its provisions will not give a right of
action, but if it has been carried out in whole or in part, a recovery
may be had for the reasonable.value'of the benefits received under it.
No such remedy, it is said, can be allowed against a municipality
under an oral contract requirel by statute to be reduced to writing,
even though" the contract was made by the proper authorities, with
full power to make it, and has been fully performed, and the munici-
pality has received the full benefit contracted for. We do not believe
any statute has been passed that calls for such a construction, or that
any legislature contemplated any such inequitable result. Judicial
legislation, if you choose to call it such, is certain to modify and les-
sen the severity of some of the decisions on this subject. The stand
of the courts against any attempt to evade statutory requirements,
in-municipal contracts in matters substantial, has resulted in great
good, but in some cases this has been carried so far that it would be
well to hark back to the words of Chief Justice FIIxIrD in Pimental v.
City of San Francisco (supra).
vIndependent of any personal views, it may be conceded that the
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remedy in quasi contract, as against municipalities, is subject'to
several limitations.
First.- A municipality cannot be required to pay for benefits re-
ceived under a contract that it had not the power to make. If it can-
not make an express contract in relation to the subject matter, then
no contract can be implied.
Second. An individual contracts with a municipality at his peril.
He is conclusively presumed to know the limitations upon its power
and upon the authority of its officers in making the contract.
Third. A municipality cannot be held liable for borrowed money
unless the power to borrow money is expiessly given by statute, or
necessarily implied.
Fourth. Where the statute provides that a municipal contract
must be made only on the taking of some steps which may fairly be
regarded as conditions precedent to the incurring of liability; as on
the vote of electors, or on the approval of some officer.or committee,
or on advertising for bid§, then in case an express contract is made
without these conditions precedent being complied with, the contract
is void; and the fact that the municipality has* received benefits under
it and the other party has sustained loss does not give a remedy in
quasi'contract for the benefits received. To allow a recovery in such a
case would sanction an evasion, if not a violation, of statutes passed
to protect the public from recklessness and extravagance in public
officials.
Fifth. Where a municipality has received money or ofher prop-
erty of another under a contract that it i§ without power to make and
has such property in its possession, it may be compelled to refund
or restore the same; but if the money has been expended, or the prop-
erty devoted to municipal purposes, then, as a rule, no recovery in-
volving an increase in taxation can be had.
Sixth. When the statute expressly. prohibits the enforcing of an
implied obligation against a municipality in relation to a subject
matter, then there is no remedy in quasi contract.*
Seventh. Some courts have held that where the statute provides
that certain contracts of a municipality shall be void unless reduced
to writing and signed by the parties, there can be no. recovery on
express, or implied assumpsit for benefits received by the municipality
under any circumstances, unless the contract has been reduced to
writing. Perhaps this is correct?
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